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Abstr act. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) detects malicious and selfish 
nodes in a network. Ad hoc networks are often secured by using either intrusion 
detection or by secure routing. Designing efficient IDS for wireless ad-hoc 
networks that would not affect the performance of the network significantly is 
indeed a challenging task. Arguably, the most common thing in a review paper 
in the domain of wireless networks is to compare the performances of different 
solutions using simulation results. However, variance in multiple configuration 
aspects including that due to different underlying routing protocols, makes the 
task of simulation based comparative evaluation of IDS solutions somewhat 
unrealistic. In stead, the authors have followed an analytic approach to identify 
the gaps in the existing IDS solutions for MANETs and wireless mesh networks. 
The paper aims to ease the job of a new researcher by exposing him to the state 
of the art research issues on IDS. Nearly 80% of the works cited in this paper 
are published with in last 3 to 4 years. 
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1   Introduction 
An intrusion may be defined as any action that attempt to compromise the 
integrity, confidentiality or availability of a resource or that goes against the security 
goals of a resource. This can be something as severe as stealing confidential data or 
misusing the email system for spam. External intrusion attempts are targeted to cause 
congestion, propagate incorrect routing information, prevent services from working 
properly or shutdown them completely. The internal intrusions could be a lot more 
damaging since malicious insider already belongs to the network as an authorized 
party. Since prevention of intrusions is not always possible, supportive intrusion 
detection techniques are required. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are not to 
prevent or deter attacks. Instead, the purpose is to alert the users about possible 
attacks, ideally in time to stop the attack or mitigate the damage [1].  
Detecting Intrusion is difficult, particularly in the wireless domain. IDS often 
attempts to differentiate abnormal activities from the normal ones. Unfortunately, 
2       Soharab Hossain Shaikh, Nabendu Chaki 
normal activities can be varied, and an attack may have resemblance to normal 
activities. Also, consistency of data in the time domain can detect unusual behavior 
but unusual behavior is not necessarily malicious. An IDS reaches perfection if it 
accurately detects majority of attacks and hardly makes any false or phantom 
detection. One basic assumption while designing any IDS should be that the attacker 
is intelligent and that the attacker has no shortage of resources.  
An IDS essentially consists of three functions. First, the IDS must monitor some 
event and maintain the history of data related to that event. Second, the IDS must be 
equipped with an analysis engine that processes the collected data. It detects unusual 
or malicious signs in the data by measuring the consistency of data in the time 
domain. Currently there are two basic approaches to analysis: misuse detection and 
anomaly-based detection. Third, the IDS must generate a response, which is typically 
an alert to system administrators. It is up to the system administrator, how he wants to 
scrutinize the system after receiving an alert.  
1.1 Why IDS solutions need to be different for  MANET and WMN? 
In MANETs, mobile nodes communicate with each other without the assistance of 
any infrastructure. The communication between nodes, not directly in transmission 
range, is performed via multiple hops, i.e., nodes cooperate and forward packets for 
other nodes. In addition to that, in WMN some nodes are stationary forming a kind of 
backbone and possibly functioning as gateway to further networks like the Internet. 
Thus from the architectural point of view, a MANET is necessarily a infrastructure-
less or ad-hoc network, whereas a mesh networks uses a backbone.  
Due to this basic difference in architecture, security issues, as considered for 
MANETs, are often quite different compared to that for WMNs. Some of these at 
times are in favor of the attacker and some in favor of protecting the network from 
intrusion. As for instance, let's consider that an attacker wants to launch a wormhole 
attack in both types of networks. When the mobility of the nodes is high in a 
MANET, it becomes practically impossible for the attacker to establish the “tunnel” 
through which packets are routed to another point in the network. The scenario is 
different in case of WMNs as the backbone routers are static and if such nodes are 
compromised, “tunnels” can be easily built through them. On the other hand, in case 
of a WMN, one may deploy more robust IDS solutions that uses the backbone of the 
mesh network. Thus, even if some of the protocols do well towards securing both 
MANET and WMNs, tailor-made solutions are required keeping in mind the 
differences of the two types of wireless networks. The study in this paper reveals that 
many gaps still exist for detecting intrusions, particularly in case of mesh networks, 
that has been relatively new and deployed more recently. 
1.2 Organization of the Paper  
In this paper, we have studied most recent works for IDS for MANETs and 
wireless mesh networks. In section 2 of this paper, we have reported and analyzed 
seven different IDS approaches for MANET out of which four has been published in 
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last 4 years. In section 3, 100% of the six reported IDS approaches on wireless mesh 
networks have been proposed in last 2 years. Each of the sections 2 and 3 ends with 
separate tables highlighting the basic features and limitations of the existing IDS 
solutions.  
Survey papers like this one often include simulation results to compare different 
approaches. However, here the authors have carefully avoided simulation for 
performance evaluation for a couple of reasons. Firstly, different approaches for 
intrusion detection assume different configurations in the network. Even the 
underlying routing protocols are not the same. Some of the approaches claim to be 
compatible with multiple existing routing protocols. However, there would be 
significant impact in the simulation results for such variance. This in turn would spoil 
the entire purpose of the simulation. Besides, the paper covers a total of 13 IDS 
solutions, most of which have been published very recently. Usually simulation based 
graphs are good for comparing a small number of alternate solutions. Thus, in stead of 
simulations, the authors have followed a careful analytic approach to compare the 
works referred.   
2   IDS for  Mobile Ad-hoc Networks 
A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) can be defined as a collection of mobile 
nodes that are geographically distributed and communicate with one another over a 
wireless medium. Ideally, in a MANET, each node is assumed to be a friendly node 
and participates willingly in relaying messages to their ultimate destinations. A 
mobile ad hoc network is built on ad-hoc demand and consists of some wireless nodes 
moving within a geographically distributed area. These nodes can join or leave the 
network at any time. MANET does not use fixed infrastructure and does not have a 
centralized administration. The nodes communicate on a peer-to-peer basis. The 
networks are built on the basis of mutual cooperation and trust. This leads to an 
inherent weakness of security.  
Security in mobile wireless ad hoc networks was particularly difficult to achieve, 
notably because of the vulnerability of the links, the limited physical protection of 
each of the nodes, the sporadic nature of connectivity, the dynamically changing 
topology, the absence of a certification authority, and the lack of a centralized 
monitoring or management point [11]. This, in effect, underscored the need for 
intrusion detection, prevention, and related countermeasures. Like any other research 
area, one needs to do a systematic re-search of the existing works in the area of 
intrusion detection too. In a very recent paper [4], a number of IDS methods have 
been described for MANET. Although the compilation is good, no serious attempt has 
been initiated to identify the gaps in the works cited. Survey papers on IDSs for 
Wireless Mesh Networks are very few in numbers. In [2], contrary to the promise of 
the title of the paper, the methods referred are mostly applicable for wireless ad-hoc 
networks and MANETs. 
Before one attempts to detect an intrusion, it is important to understand the nature 
and variation of attacks. The work by Martin Antonio [5] provides a fairly good 
analysis of MANET specific attacks and risk analysis by identifying assets, 
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vulnerabilities and threats, usable for future MANET deployments and security work. 
Consequently, security solutions with static configuration would not suffice, and the 
assumption that all nodes can be bootstrapped with the credentials of all other nodes 
would be unrealistic for a wide range of MANET applications [3]. In practice, it is not 
possible to build a completely secure MANET system in spite of using the most 
complex cryptographic technique or so-called secured routing protocols. Some of the 
IDS algorithms that have been developed for MANETs are explained below. A 
comparative study is provided at the end of this section. 
IDSX [1] was a cluster-based solution which used an extended architecture. The 
proposed solution acted as a second line of defense. Individual nodes could 
implement any IDS solution. IDSX was compatible with any IDS solution acting as 
the first line of defense. Simulation results show that the IDSX solution hardly 
produced any false positives. This was because it formed a consensus of the responses 
from different individual IDS solutions implemented in the nodes. Anomaly-based 
intrusion detection schemes could be deployed as the first line of defense. The 
proposed approach in [1] works within preset boundaries. In general, these are quite 
feasible and practical enough considering the nature of ad hoc networks. However, 
some of these may also be considered as the limiting constraints. IDSX has not been 
compared with any of the existing IDS solutions. Also, the proposed two-step 
approach would make the task of intrusion detection expensive in terms of energy and 
resource consumption. 
In another innovative approach in [7],  a solution is proposed using the concept of 
unsupervised learning in Artificial Neural Networks using Self-Organizing Maps. The 
technique named eSOM used a data structure called U-matrix which was used to 
represent data classes. Those regions which represented malicious information were 
watermarked using the Block-Wise method. Regions representing the benign data 
class was marked using the Lattice method. When a new attack is launched it causes 
changes in the pixel values. eSOM and the Watermarking technique can together 
identify if any pixel has been modified. This makes it very sensitive towards detecting 
intrusions. The authors claim that the solution is 80% efficient and remains consistent 
even with variations in mobility. Mentioned below are some of the drawbacks of this 
work [7]. The IDS employing eSOM would be trained in regular time periods.  This 
results in additional overhead and takes a toll on the energy efficiency of the 
algorithm. However, the proposed intrusion detection engine has not been employed 
on various routing protocols for the detection of various types of attacks. 
A leader election model for IDS in MANET based on the Vicky, Clarke and 
Groves (VCG) model was suggested in [8]. This requires every node to be as honest 
as possible. Leaders are elected in a manner which results in optimal resource 
utilization. Leaders are positively rewarded for participating honestly in the election 
process. By balancing the resource consumption amongst the nodes, a higher effective 
lifetime of the nodes was achieved. Experimental results indicate that the VCG model 
performs well during leader election by producing a higher percentage of alive nodes. 
However, the simulation results indicate that the normal nodes will carry out more 
duty of intrusion detection and die faster when there are more selfish nodes. Besides, 
as selfish nodes do not exhaust energy to run the IDS service, the percentage of 
packet analysis decreases with time. This is a severe security concern. In the case of 
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static scenarios, the model elects the same node as leader repeatedly. This causes the 
normal nodes to die very fast.  
CONFIDANT, another approach, similar to Watchdog and Path-rater scheme, has 
been proposed to overcome the drawbacks of the Watchdog and Path-rater by 
ignoring misbehaving nodes in the routing process [9]. Every node identifies its 
neighbors as friends and enemies, based on trust. Friends are informed of enemies. 
CONFIDANT claims that the packet delivery ratio is very high (97% and above). A 
couple of the issues that still leaves a gap in [9] are mentioned below. However, 
CONFIDANT keeps the packet delivery ratio high even in a very hostile 
environment, with the assumption that enough redundant paths are available to reach 
the destination node, bypassing the malicious ones. This assumption may not always 
hold. Also, in comparing the throughput of clients and servers, the CONFIDANT 
fortified network performs very poorly in contrast to the benign network. 
SCAN [10] is based on two central ideas. First, each node monitors its neighbors 
for routing or packet forwarding misbehavior, independently. Second, every node 
observes its neighbors by cross validating the overhead traffic with other nodes. 
Nodes are declared malicious by a majority decision. This assumes that the network 
density is sufficiently high. However, in SCAN the network services are temporarily 
halted during intrusion detection. The lack of mobility reduces the detection 
efficiency. The assumption that network density is high may not always hold. 
Increase in mobility results in higher false positives.  Besides, the packet delivery 
ratio can be heavily affected in the interval during which an attack is launched and 
when it is detected. Also, the communication overhead for SCAN grows with increase 
in the percentage of malicious nodes and with mobility.  
In HIDS [3], another approach to the IDS has been proposed. HIDS is based on 
trust or reputation or honesty values of the mobile nodes. The trust value of a node is 
dynamically increased or decreased depending on its behavior. When a node behaves 
normally, it is positively rewarded; malicious activity results in negative rewards for 
that node. The trust on a node is recomputed based on its current honesty rate, and the 
rewards that it has earned. A comparative study between SCAN and HIDS shows that 
the latter involves lower storage and communicational overhead than SCAN. HIDS is 
inherently protected against false positives. However, maintaining up-to-date tables at 
different nodes, as required by HIDS, may not be an energy-efficient strategy. Also 
the proposed HIDS offers only a generic architecture for secure route detection. More 
detailed testing is required before it can be used for secure routing in MANET 
applications. 
In [16] OCEAN was proposed as another extension to the DSR protocol. OCEAN 
also uses a monitoring system and a reputation system. The proposed solution 
exchanges second-hand reputation messages. OCEAN implements a stand-alone 
architecture to avoid phantom intrusion detections. Depending on whether a node 
participates in the route discovery process, OCEAN can detect misbehaving nodes 
and selfish nodes. However, the detection efficiency of OCEAN rapidly decreases 
with increase in the density of misbehaving nodes. Simulation results show that at 
high threshold values, other second hand protocols perform better with high mobility 
of the nodes. Also, the mobility model simulated for OCEAN is not very realistic. At 
high mobility, OCEAN is very sensitive to change of the threshold parameter, while 
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second hand protocols are more consistent over varying threshold limits. OCEAN is 
not quite effective in penalizing misleading nodes.  
A hybrid solution, proposed in [17], combines the Watchdog and Path-Raters 
scheme proposed by Marti et al. and SCAN[10]. However, neither SCAN nor 
Watchdog and Path-raters address the mobility issue that well. As a result, this hybrid 
solution also suffers from the same problems. Besides, there are no fixed nodes which 
can behave as umpires. There must be some kind of a leader election model which 
runs in every node to select the Umpire nodes. This results in an increased overhead 
and energy consumption. The authors did mention the scenario where Umpire nodes 
themselves can become malicious. However, it still remains as a drawback of the 
method. In order to detect DoS attacks like flooding, the criteria for attack detection 
cannot be so rigid. Also, the history of a node that had being behaving normal, should 
be taken in to consideration before writing it off as malicious as soon as it deviates 
from normal behavior. 
Table 1. Summary on Comparison for Different IDS for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks 
 
IDS 
Reference 
Under -lying 
Routing 
Protocol 
Architecture Types of 
attacks 
addressed 
Comments 
 
IDSX [1] 
(2007). 
Compatible 
with any 
routing 
protocol 
Extended 
Hierarchical 
Architecture 
Routing 
misbehavior - 
dirty packet 
forwarding. 
1. The solution talks about a two-step 
approach. This leads to making the intrusion 
detection approach quite expensive in terms 
of energy and resource consumption. 
Neural 
Networks and 
Watermarking 
Technique [7] 
(2007) 
AODV Self Organizing 
Maps (Neural 
Networks) 
Routing 
behavior 
attack and 
Resource 
utilization 
attack. 
1. The IDS using eSOM needs to be trained 
in regular interval.  This additional overhead 
affects the energy efficiency of the algorithm. 
2. The proposed intrusion detection engine 
has not been employed for various routing 
protocols for detection of different attacks. 
CONFIDANT 
[9] (2002) 
DSR Distributed and 
Cooperative. 
Packet drop 
attack. 
1. CONFIDANT assumes that there are 
enough nodes to provide harmless alternate 
partial paths around malicious nodes. This 
may not always hold. 
2. A CONFIDANT fortified network with 
one third malicious nodes does not provide 
any additional benefits over a regular benign 
DSR network without malicious nodes.  
HIDS [3] 
(2008) 
Compatible 
with reactive 
And proactive 
routing 
protocols.  
Distributed and 
Collaborative 
Packet drops, 
black-hole 
attack, 
Resource 
utilization 
attacks 
1. Maintenance of tables at different nodes 
affects energy efficiency and communication 
overhead.  
2. Detailed testing is required before it can be 
used for secure routing in MANET 
applications. 
Leader 
Election 
Model [8] 
(2008) 
Not specified. Based on the 
Vickey, Clarke, 
and 
Groves (VCG) 
model by which 
truth-telling is 
the dominant 
strategy for 
each node. 
Resource 
utilization 
attack-selfish 
nodes. 
1. Simulation results indicate that normal 
nodes will work more to detect intrusion and 
die faster in presence of selfish nodes. 
2. As selfish nodes do not exhaust energy to 
run the IDS service, the percentage of packet 
analysis decreases with time.  
3. In the case of static scenarios, the model 
elects the same node as leader repeatedly. 
This causes the normal nodes to die very fast.  
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SCAN [10] 
(2006) 
AODV Distributed and 
Collaborative 
Routing 
misbehavior 
and packet 
forwarding 
misbehavior 
1. Network services are temporarily halted 
during intrusion detection.  
2. Lack of mobility reduces the detection 
efficiency.  
3. The assumption that network density is 
high may not always hold. Increase in 
mobility results in higher false positives.  
4. Packet delivery ratio can be heavily 
affected in the interval between an attack is 
launched and when it is detected. 
5. The communication overhead steadily 
increases with increase in the percentage of 
malicious nodes and with mobility.  
OCEAN [16] 
(2003) 
Not identified Stand - alone 
IDS 
Routing 
behavior 
attack, 
resource 
utilization 
attack, rushing 
attack. 
1.  At high faulty thresholds, approaches like 
SEC-HAND protocols are able to perform 
better than OCEAN at high mobility.  
2. At lower numbers of misbehaving nodes, 
the performance of OCEAN falls drastically. 
3. OCEAN is not very effective in thwarting 
the throughput of the misleading nodes. 
A System of 
Umpires [17] 
(2010) 
Not identified Stand - alone 
IDS for single 
user; 
Collaborative 
IDS for double 
and triple Users 
Routing 
misbehavior 
attack and 
Packet 
Dropping 
attack. 
1. Umpires are not static. Some kind of 
leader election is required. This may require 
additional energy. 
2. Attack detection criteria are very rigid. 
3. Nodes are not rewarded for normal 
behavior. 
3. IDS for  Wireless Mesh Networks 
The proposed methodology successfully detects any moving object maintaining 
low computational complexity and low memory requirements. 
Although mobility of nodes was removed and a certain infrastructure was 
established for Sensor Networks, yet these remained vulnerable to security threats. 
Researchers realized that mobility is a feature which cannot be compromised with as 
it provides tremendous flexibility to end users. Yet, retaining an infrastructure would 
definitely be helpful.  All these underlying observations led to the conclusion that a 
different type of network must be designed which incorporates both the mobility of 
clients and a basic infrastructure. This had been a major driving factor behind the 
inception of Wireless Mesh Networks. 
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) consist of mesh routers and mesh clients, where 
mesh routers have minimal mobility and form the backbone of WMNs [2]. They 
provide network access for both mesh and conventional clients. The integration of 
WMNs with other networks such as the Internet, cellular, IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.15, 
IEEE 802.16, sensor networks, etc., can be accomplished through the gateway and 
bridging functions in the mesh routers. WMNs include mesh routers forming an 
infrastructure for clients that connect to them. The WMN infrastructure/backbone can 
be built using various types of radio technologies.  
The client meshing provides peer-to-peer networks among client devices. In this 
type of architecture, client nodes constitute the actual network to perform routing and 
configuration functionalities as well as providing end user applications to customers. 
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Hence, a mesh router is not required for these types of networks. In Client WMNs, a 
packet destined to a node in the network hops through multiple nodes to reach the 
destination. Client WMNs are usually formed using one type of radios on devices. 
Moreover, the requirements on end-user devices is increased when compared to 
infrastructure meshing, since, in Client WMNs, the end-users must perform additional 
functions such as routing and self-configuration. 
Mesh clients can access the network through mesh routers as well as directly 
meshing with other mesh clients. While the infrastructure provides connectivity to 
other networks such as the Internet, Wi-Fi, WiMAX, cellular, and sensor networks; 
the routing capabilities of clients provide improved connectivity and coverage inside 
the WMN. The hybrid architecture will be the most applicable case in our opinion. 
The redundancy and self-healing capabilities of WMNs provide for less downtime, 
with messages continuing to be delivered even when paths are blocked or broken. The 
self-configuring, self-tuning, self-healing, and self-monitoring capabilities of mesh 
can help to reduce the management burden for system administrators. Besides, the 
advanced mesh networking protocols coordinate the network so that nodes can go into 
sleep mode while inactive and then synchronize quickly for sending, receiving, and 
forwarding messages. This ability provides greatly extended battery life.  
A mesh network can be deliberately over-provisioned simply by adding extra 
devices, so that each device has two or more paths for sending data. This is a much 
simpler and less expensive way of obtaining redundancy than is possible in most other 
types of networks.  In comparison to the cost of point-to-point copper wiring and 
conduit required for traditional wired networks, wireless mesh networks are typically 
much less expensive. The protocols that have been developed so far for WMNs are 
described briefly. A comparative study is provided at the end of this section. 
A technique was devised based on the communication history between two 
communicating clients through a common set of routers in [15]. Individual trust 
relationships are evaluated for both clients sharing the common set of routers. 
Malicious clients are detected based on threshold values. The algorithm performs well 
when the density of malicious nodes is low. Routers in the path have to perform 
O(N2) operations to cooperatively reach a conclusion. It is found that false positives 
are reduced to a great extent but not eliminated. The algorithm performs better only 
when the percentage of misbehaving clients is smaller. Performance degrades as 
malicious activity within the network increases. 
RADAR [12] introduces a general concept of reputation. Highly detailed 
evaluation metrics are used to measure the behavior of mesh nodes. This allows 
RADAR to better classify / distinguish normal behavior from anomalous activity. 
RADAR takes into consideration the spatio-temporal behavior of nodes before 
declaring them as malicious. Simulation results show that RADAR detects routing 
loops with higher false alarms. The algorithm is resilient to malicious collectives for 
subverting reputations; but involves a relatively high latency for detection of DoS 
attacks. The Detection Overhead Ratio (DOR) is directly proportional to the number 
of anomaly detectors and the size of detection window implemented in the algorithm.  
Although developed initially for wired networks, Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) based method [11] could also be implemented for wireless networks. The 
threshold value used in [11] for detecting malicious nodes assumes that network 
traffic follows the normal distribution. Tuning the threshold also reduces the number 
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of phantom intrusion detections considerably. The proposed solution is energy-
efficient. However, despite the promises, the PCA based method in [11] is not 
consistent to variations in normal network traffic due to unrealistic assumptions in the 
method. Anomalies such as node outages cannot be detected as this method [11] looks 
for spurious traffic generation. A statistical analysis of how the behavior varies with 
changing threshold values is yet to be performed.  
In [14] a solution to defend against selective forwarding attacks based on AODV 
routing protocol is presented. The algorithm works in two phases – detecting 
malicious activities in the network and identifying the attacker, respectively. 
However, the proposed methodology of [14] suffers from some serious limitations. 
The proposed scheme fails to detect attackers when the threshold value is less than the 
throughput. Even in the absence of an attacker, the throughput is low when the 
detection threshold is higher than throughput of the path. Performance overhead of the 
system increases with increase in the density of malicious nodes. 
OpenLIDS [13] analyzes the ability of mesh nodes to perform intrusion detection. 
Due to the resource constraints of mesh nodes, detailed traffic analysis is not feasible 
in WMNs. An energy – efficient scheme was proposed in OpenLIDS. Results show 
that performance improved for detecting malicious behavior in mesh nodes. 
OpenLIDS is an improvement over other signature-based approaches both in terms of 
memory requirements and packet delivery ratio. However, simulation results show 
that OpenLIDS is unable to distinguish an RTP stream from a UDP DoS flood with 
fixed source and destination ports. For new connections, this approach is not as 
efficient as expected as generating and receiving connection tracking events is costly.  
In [6], a framework has been proposed that is based on a reputation system. This 
isolates ill-behaved nodes by rating their reputation as low, and distributed agents 
based on unsupervised learning algorithms, that are able to detect deviations from the 
normal behavior. The solution is very effective in detecting novel intrusions. This 
algorithm had already been deployed for WSNs. Experimental results show that even 
though redundancy reduces drastically in WMNs the proposed method works 
efficiently. However, the approach is not fast enough to prevent the neighbor nodes 
from being affected by an attack. Also, initially the solution [6] cannot exactly 
determine the source of the anomaly. Therefore, the system reduces the reputation of 
all the nodes within the malicious region. 
Table 2. Summary on Comparison for Different IDS for Wireless Mesh Networks 
 
IDS 
Reference 
Under -lying 
Routing 
Protocol 
Architecture Types of 
attacks 
addressed 
Comments 
 
Trust based 
approach I 
[14] 
(2008). 
 
AODV Distributed 
System 
Gray hole 
attacks. 
1. The overhead of the system increases with 
the number of attackers. 
2. When detection threshold is less than the 
throughput of a path, attacks will not be 
detected and network throughput will suffer. 
3. On the contrary, when the detection 
threshold is higher than throughput of the 
path, the throughput would suffer even if 
there is no attacker. 
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Trust based 
approach II 
[15] 
(2008) 
Not specified. Distributed  
Systems 
Misbehavior 
of a node 
1. The detection efficiency decreases and 
false positive rate increases with the increase 
of percentage of malicious clients. 
2. False positives are reduced to a great extent 
but not eliminated. 
Principal 
Component 
Analysis 
(PCA) [11] 
(2008). 
 
Not specified Distributed  
Systems 
DoS, port 
scan, jamming 
etc. 
 
1. Anomalies such as node outages are not 
detected as the method looks for spurious 
traffic generation. 
2. Analysis on performance evaluation with 
changing threshold values is yet to be 
performed. 
3. The method is not consistent due to 
unrealistic assumptions on network traffic.  
RADAR 
[12] 
(2008). 
 
DSR Distributed  
Systems 
Malicious 
behavior of a 
node, DOS 
Attack, 
Routing Loop 
Attack. 
1. Higher false alarms. 
2. Resilient to malicious collectives for 
subverting reputations. 
3. High latency for detection of DoS attacks.  
4. The Detection Overhead Ratio (DOR) is a 
linear overhead.  
OpenLIDS 
[13] 
(2009). 
 
Not specified Distributed  
Systems 
Resource 
starvation 
attacks, mass 
mailing of 
internet 
worms, IP 
spoofing. 
1.  Higher false positives as OpenLIDS is 
unable to distinguish between RTP stream 
and a UDP DoS flood with fixed source and 
destination ports.   
2. Not as efficient for new connections. 
3. It is not possible to arbitrarily adjust 
timeout values. 
Reputation 
systems and 
self-
organizing 
maps. [6] 
(2010). 
Not specified. Distributed 
agent based 
Systems 
Routing 
misbehavior 
and resource 
utilization 
attacks. 
1. It is assumed that the confidentiality and 
integrity cannot be preserved for any node. 
2. The reputation system identifies the 
attacked node immediately. However, it is not 
fast enough to prevent the neighbor nodes 
from being affected 
4. Conclusion 
The thirst of flexibility in operations and application requirements for wider access 
has triggered the evolution of ad-hoc networks. The infrastructure-less ad-hoc 
networks offer even greater flexibility when the nodes are mobile. This flexibility is 
however two-fold. Just the way, a greater number of applications are made possible in 
ad-hoc networks, especially for MANETs, the lack of centralized control, dedicated 
security infrastructure, non-standard topology, etc. offers additional “flexibility” to 
the intruder as well. Designing efficient IDS that would not affect the performance of 
the network is in fact an uphill task due to the vulnerability of the links, the limited 
physical protection of the nodes, the irregularity and dynamic changes in topology, 
and the lack of a centralized authority and monitoring. In spite of this, recent works 
propose adept IDS methodologies that extract the advantages of base station in sensor 
networks and the backbone in wireless mesh networks. In section 1 of the paper, the 
reasons for avoiding simulation have been explained. Instead, critical analytic 
comparisons are done for 13 different IDS solutions. The findings are summarized in 
tables I to II. An IDS needs a scalable architecture to collect sufficient evidences to 
detect those attacks effectively. Researchers are now being motivated to design a new 
IDS architecture that involves cross layer design to efficiently detect the abnormalities 
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in the wireless networks. The selection of correct combination of layers in the design 
of cross layer IDS is very critical to detect attacks targeted at or sourced from any 
layers rapidly. It is optimal to incorporate MAC layer in the cross layer design for 
IDS to detect DoS attacks. This cross layer technique incorporating IDS leads to an 
escalating detection rate in the number of malicious behavior of nodes increasing the 
true positive and reducing false positives in the MANET. The current study may be 
extended to review recent works on cross-layer IDS architecture. 
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